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The arguments
of attorneys Seth
Waxman (left),
David Ogden, and
Danielle Spinelli in
Roper v. Simmons
helped convince the
Supreme Court that
it is unconstitutional
to execute juvenile
offenders who were
under the age of 18
when their crimes
were committed.

JAY MALLIN

The most heinous killers,
although not yet 18 when they
murdered, may still deserve to die.

''Aposter child for us"that's what Seth Waxman, the lawyer urging
the U.S. Supreme Court to outlaw the 'juvenile" death
penalty, called Mark Anthony Duke. Four justicesStephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, John Paul Stevens,
and David Souter-had already publicly declared the juvenile death penalty "shameful," while Justices Antonin
Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and William Rehnquist could be
counted on to support a state's right to decide on a case-bycase basis. Anthony Kennedy's vote would be key. "Chilling
reading," Justice Kennedy observed, pointing to Alabama's
amicus brief cataloguing young killers it had condemned to
die. "Look at those examples, the very first one," Waxman
shot back, focusing on Mark Anthony Duke. "This is a kid
who went on a killing spree." His behavior demonstrated
"transient aspects of youth" rather than "a stable, enduring
character." Thus, the Constitution forbade his execution,
and, concluded the abolitionist lawyer replying to Justice
Kennedy during oral argument, Mark Anthony Duke was "a
poster child for us."
This characterization may well have had its impact: On
March 1, 2005, in Roper vs. Simmons (543 U.S. 551), the
United States Supreme Court, 5-4, made headlines, categorically striking down the death penalty for 16- or 17year-olds as unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy supplied

the key fifth vote and wrote the
majority opinion. "Progressives" have hailed this opinion
as a triumph for human dignity and decency, a step in the
right direction that only enhances the administration of
justice. How could any humane person-even those of us
who generally support the death penalty for the most
egregious criminals-disagree that kids who kill on the
spur of the moment can't possibly be among those who
deserve to die?
But some of us don't see it quite that way. We insist that
far from refining and improving the administration of
justice, this watershed decision, fundamentally flawed
and flatly wrong in spots, seriously undermines a system
of justice devoted to ensuring that the "worst of the
worst" do get their just deserts.
Now that Mark Anthony Duke has been spared the
death penalty and transferred to general population, the
world at large may forget this "poster child's" "transient"
behavior on March 22, 1997, and the response it warrants. But we cannot...

The Duke and Simmons cases
Generally annoyed at his father who was "always on my case
about something," but especially angry when his father
refused to lend him the family truck, Duke, 16, enlisted his
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older friend to help kill his father. But
Dedra Hunt, his father's live-in girlfriend, and her two young children,
ages 6 and 7, would also be at home.
No matter. According to Duke's plan,
his friend Brandon would kill Dedra.
Duke would take care of the rest.
Armed with a .45 he had carefully
wiped clean, Mark Anthony Duke
brought his friend Brandon Samra,
19, to his house. In the kitchen,
Duke told his father he was tired of
being bossed around and shot him
to death. Meanwhile, Dedra and her
children were on the couch by the
fireplace, watching television. Samra
shot Dedra in her face. Bleeding,
Dedra fled upstairs with her little
girls, Samra chasing after her, shooting but missing. Dedra locked herself in the bathroom with her
six-year-old. Samra, out of bullets,
couldn't pry the door open, but
Duke kicked it down, and, as Dedra
begged for her life, he shot her in
the forehead, killing her instantly.
Sixteen-year-old Duke then found
six-year-old Chelisa cowering in the
shower. "It will only hurt for a
minute," Duke assured her as he slit
the child's throat with a kitchen
knife. Then Duke searched and
found seven-year-old Chelsea, hiding, terrified, under her bed. While
she struggled he slashed her face
and hands 15 times, but he could not
slit her throat. So Duke ordered
Samra who first refused, but, afraid
of Duke, slit the child's throat as
Duke held her down.
Now Duke began an elaborate, calculated, cover-up. He carefully
cleaned up the house, then took his
friends to see the movie "Scream,"
ordering them to keep the ticket stubs
as proof of an alibi. Then they had
dinner and shot pool. Overnight,
Duke must have had second thoughts,
because the next day, he brought his
friends back to the home, and ransacked it to make it look like robbery.
Then Duke dialed 911: He had just
discovered his family murdered.
When the police arrived, an apparently frightened Duke gratefully
accepted protective custody.
According to the state medical
examiner, six-year-old Chelisa suf-
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fer.ed two 5 1/ 4 inch lacerations
across her throat at Duke's hands.
Like her older sister, before she died,
the child aspirated her own blood
for several minutes. It hadn't "only
hurt for a minute."
An Alabama jury sentenced Mark
Anthony Duke to die.
Seth Waxman, however, wasn't
representing this poster child. His
client, Christopher Simmons, at 17
also the leader of his pack, convinced
younger friends they'd "get away with
it" because they were minors. In the
middle of the night, Simmons broke
into a house he had picked at random, dragged Shirley Crook from
her bed, duct-taped her eyes and
mouth, bound her hands, and drove
her minivan to a state park. They
walked the terrified victim to a railroad trestle, tied her hands and feet
together with electrical wire,
wrapped her entire face in duct tape
and threw her from the bridge to
drown in the Meramec River. Later,
Simmons bragged about the killing,
telling friends he had killed a woman
"because the bitch seen my face." A
jury in Missouri had sentenced Simmons to die, and now, years later, the
Court was deciding whether states
with the death penalty could ever
constitutionally condemn 16- or 17year-olds.
Using highly questionable measures, as Justice Scalia acidly pointed
out in dissent, the Court found
American "standards of decency"
had "evolved" into a national consensus against the juvenile death
penalty. History will show that this
"consensus" is at best speculative and
probably false. Can anyone honestly
insist that once exposed to the grisly
details of Mark Anthony Duke's multiple murders-carefully planned
and covered up, leaving a little girl,
lying on the floor next to her Legos,
her throat slit, to bleed to death-a
majority of Americans would vote to
let him live out his life in general
population?

Drawing the line
Why draw a constitutional bright line
at 18? True, as the majority pointed
out, "almost every State prohibits
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those under 18 from voting, serving
on juries, or marrying without
parental consent." But most states
allow 16- and 17-year-olds to drive
cars-relying on their mature judgment and split-second decision making to operate high-speed, multi-ton
death machines among the public.
Many states also set 16 as the age at
which a woman may consent to have
an abortion-to terminate a potential human life. And many states,
such as New York, set 13-yes 13-as
the age of full criminal responsibility
for non-capital murder.
An extraordinary 13-year-old can
get life in prison, 14-year-olds may be
tried and convicted as adults for
many other serious felonies, and 16year-olds are punishable as adults for
all crimes. Of course, prosecutors
and judges may channel young criminals into a juvenile system, based
upon an individual case-by-case
analysis. Why, then, not do it case-bycase with the death penalty? Certainly the community has judged
that 16-year-olds can be fully responsible for their own choices.
When a 16-year-old bravely runs
into a house ablaze, risking his life to
save two young children, we justifiably celebrate and reward this heroism. We do not-nor should
we-dismiss this goodness and bravery as a product of a not-yet fully
formed personality. We see this
heroic act as clearly manifesting
great and good character. If we can
fully celebrate the heroism of our
best youth, why can we not fully condemn cowardly and vicious selfishness of our worst?
Of course adolescents may be particularly susceptible to peer influence, while feeling invulnerable
toward risks of punishment, and particularly unconcerned with the
future punitive consequences attaching to their present homicidal behavior. Adolescent behavior may be
impulsive. Youth ordinarily does
diminish culpability. The majority of
the Court does reflect the majority of
the People, insisting that "retribution is not proportional if the law's
most severe penalty is imposed on
one whose culpability or blamewor-

thiness is diminished, to a substantial
degree, by reason of youth and immaturity" (emphasis added).
True, Mark Anthony Duke, 16,
their "poster child," was the younger
of the killing duo. But he was the
source not the subject of peer pressure. He initiated, planned, executed, and carefully covered up the
mass murder. He coerced the dimwitted 19-year-old Brandon Samra to
go along with it. Nor was Christopher Simmons subject to outside
pressure, acting in the fury of the
moment. He played the adult role,
planning the random burglary/murder and assuring his younger friends
they could "get away with it" because
they were underage.

Almost never is not never
During closing argument, the prosecutor had improperly suggested that
the jury treat Simmons's youth as an
aggravating circumstance. Being
young may make a killer more dangerous and less deterrable. But for us
retributivists, we who believe that
punishment should be proportional
to past culpability, youth cannot
make a person more deserving to die.
If the Court was determined to
reverse Simmons's death sentence,
and make a categorical pronouncement, it could have held that a defendant's youth may never be treated as
an aggravating circumstance. A very
strong presumption of life should
attach to juvenile killers. We should
almost never execute a person for
what he or she did at 16 or 17.
But almost never is not never.
Constitutionally, jurisprudentially,
and morally, capital crimes should be
defined narrowly, to include only the
worst of the worst. Current death
penalty statutes commonly violate this
ideal: Absent additional aggravating
circumstances, robbery-felony-murder-that most typical teenage,
impulsive murder committed by one
pushed or pulled by peers-should

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009 (2003).
Id. at 1012 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1012 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1013 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1013 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1013 (emphasis added).

not make killers-juvenile or adultdeath eligible. The "drug related"
aggravator, too, should be dropped
along with robbery. But once an individual, whether 16 or 26, apparently
falls within that class of especially
vicious killers, we should consider
that person's case and character concretely and individually. Fairness
requires no less.
If a 17-year-old, acting alone, without peer pressure, kidnaps a 7-yearold, rapes and tortures her, and
throws her off a bridge or buries her
alive, or bludgeons her to death after
she pleads for her life and tosses her
in a trash bin, then peer group pressure is irrelevant. So too are the callous killer's short time horizon and
general risk-proneness. That these
sadists or psychopaths do not consider their own future punishment
or their own personal mortality while
torturing their helpless victims is
morally irrelevant. They are the
worst of the worst and deserve to die.
We can, we should-morally, we
must-decide this, case by case.

The "scientific" evidence
But the Supreme Court majority was
categorical, four times citing and
quoting from Laurence Steinberg
and Elizabeth Scott's brief essay Less
Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the juvenile Death Penalty. 1
Steinberg and Scott, to be sure, categorically oppose a 'juvenile' death
penalty. The scientific bases for their
personal policy preference, however,
are just the opposite-tentative, noncategorical, and matters of degree.
Several statements from their essay,
which the majority fails to acknowledge, show this: "In our view it is an
open and unstudied question whether,
under real-world conditions the decision making of mid-adolescents is
truly comparable with that of adults." 2
"[A]lthough more research is needed, the
widely held stereotype that adolescents are more impulsive than adults
finds some support in research" 3
"Taken together, these findings indicate that adolescents may have more
difficulty regulating their moods,
impulses, and behaviors than do

adults" 4 So, even the abolitionists'
experts concede that "more research
is needed" to conclusively prove or
disprove that which merely finds
"some support" and only "may" be
true. Yet, they and the Court majority
simply outlaw the penalty wholesale.
Abolitionists claim that scientific
research shows teenagers have not
fully developed brains. We retributivists, who would execute sadists for
torture murders committed when
they were 16 or 17, should find it
unsettling if evidence did demonstrate a not-fully developed brain
structure as the cause of the killing.
But again, even Steinberg and Scott
concede the evidence is far from categorical: "At this point, the connection
between neurobiological and psychological evidence of age differences in
decision-making capacity is indirect
and suggestive. "5
uveniles may have
diminished decision-making capacity
compared with adults because of differences in psychosocial capacities
[that] are likely biological in origin." 6
The much larger and deeper .
debate between free will and determm1sm underlies all criminal
responsibility. But search the literature the Court cites; no connection
between organic brain development
and moral responsibility has been
explicated, much less demonstrated.
As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
declared in dissent, "the Court
adduces no evidence whatsoever in
support of its sweeping conclusion."
We who are committed to executing the worst of the worst-those,
but only those who deserve to dieinsist on a case-by-case examination.
Only if, after a detailed study of the
individual, we can conclude not only
beyond a reasonable doubt that he
or she did it, but also to a moral certainty that this is the very uncommon
young adult who deserves it, we may
and we should condemn him to die.
This case-by-case approach is not
only moral, it more naturally flows
from the very research and findings
the majority embraces.

"rn

What really counts?
The Supreme Court's decision in
Roper v. Simmons made front-page
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headlines that day and has continued
to reverberate politically, even moving justices to make a rare public
defense, and Chief Justice John
Roberts to make a rare criticism of
recent case law in his confirmation
hearings.
The majority of five and Justice
O'Connor's separate dissent together
insist that although the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of grossly
disproportionate punishment does
depend on "evolving standards of
decency," an American consensus can
be bolstered by an international consensus to indicate those evolving standards. "The basic premise of the
Court's argument-that American law
should conform to the laws of the rest
of the world-ought to be rejected
out of hand," protested Justice Scalia.
"I do not believe that the meaning of
our Eighth Amendment ... should be
determined by the subjective views of
five Members of this Court and likeminded foreigners." But, as the majority had declared repeatedly, this world
consensus was not constitutionally
"controlling." Over and over, the
majority declared it as their own
"independent judgment" that death is
an unconstitutionally "disproportionate" response to murder committed
by a 16 or 17-year-old.
Although they never explicitly
acknowledged it, the majority plus
O'Connor must hold that "gross disproportionality" and "evolving standards of decency" are real,
objectively discernable facts, independent of individual justices' personal tastes and preferences.
Retributivist advocates of the death
penalty, although vigorously opposing the result in Roper v. Simmons,
may nonetheless embrace the majority plus O'Connor's underlying
ontology: There are moral facts. Some
16- and 17-year-olds deserve to die.
Regardless of public opinion, Mark
Anthony Duke's death sentence was
not per se disproportionate. Ultimately we know this fact-that he
deserves to die-intuitively, with a
moral faculty that requires an emotional connection to the victim,
attention to the defendant's character and how it was (de)formed, and
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the motives, harm, nature, and circumstances of the crime.
Thus here the Roper majority, and
O'Connor in dissent, are correct:
Public opinion, including international public opinion, does help
guide us to the moral fact of the matter. But if an overwhelming majority
of the American public today supported the death penalty for blasphemy, or petty larceny, or drug
dealing, their anger might be understandable, but the punishment they
urged would in moral fact be disproportionate and unconstitutional.
More importantly, however, "the
overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile
death penalty" is probably non-existent, and definitely not demonstrated. Every Supreme Court justice
in Roper missed the crucial distinction between international law and
international public opmronbetween governmental elites and the
people they supposedly represent.
The Supreme Court majority simply
equates the "practices of other
nations" with "the views of the international community." It cites treaties
between governments, and parliamentary laws-the products of governmental elites-and then simply
morphs them into "the overwhelming weight of international public
opinion" or "the opinion of the
world community," when they are no
such thing. Justice O'Connor, too,
conflates "foreign and international
law" with "the views of other countries" and converts them into "the
overwhelming weight of international opinion." Even Justice Scalia
equates "the laws of the rest of the
world" with "the views of other countries and the so-called international
community" (emphasis added).
Once
exposed,
the fallacy
becomes obvious. When abolitionists
point to America's "moral isolation"
as the "only democracy" with a death
penalty, they must ignore recent surveys that show that 81 percent of the
Japanese support the death penalty. 7
Thus America becomes the "only
Western democracy with the death
penalty." But here, too, the facts are
embarrassing. Every European gov-
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ernment and Canada abolished the
death penalty, but always in the teeth
of overwhelming public support for
its continuation. Even today, decades
later, rejecting repeated attempts by
the elites-teachers, media, and governmental officials-to shame them,
a majority of Canadians, over twothirds of the British, and probably a
majority of the People in almost
every European nation continues to
support
capital
punishment. 8
Recently Poland's Parliament narrowly rejected reinstating the death
penalty in a 198-195 vote, although
opinion polls showed 77 percent of
the Poles support its return. 9
Real-world cases
Let us present fully and fairly to the
People of Europe, or Asia, or Africa,
or South America the facts of realworld cases-and not a simple distorting question in the abstract such
as 'Do you support executing juveniles?' Ask the world community
about Kenneth Loggins and Trace
Duncan, whom Alabama has condemned. Both 17, Loggins and Duncan picked up hitchhiker Vickie
Deblieux, traveling to her mother's
home in Louisiana. They took her to
a secluded spot and, after throwing
bottles at her as she tried to escape,
tackled her and then kicked and
stomped her for 30 minutes until she
died. Loggins stood on Vickie's
throat until she gurgled blood and
then exclaimed, "Okay, I'll party."
They threw Vickie into their truck,
stripped her naked, and played with
her lifeless body-at one point
inserting a beer bottle into her
vagina. When they had finished, they
7. Japan: Most People Support the Death Penalty,
ANSA - Eng. News Service, February 19,
2005.("More than 80 percent of the Japanese, the
highest rate ever, are in favour of the death
penalty, according to a government survey published on Saturday").
8. See, Most Czechs want capital punishment to
exist, Czech News Service, November 21, 2003;
Most Slovaks favor capital punishment ( 61. 7 %) in Slovakia, CTK, July 25, 2005; 63 percent of respondents
believe the death penalty should be applied in Mexico,
Angus Reid Global Scan, August 9, 2005; 6% of
Russians support death penalty, !tar-Tass, July 5,
2005.
9. Poland narrowly rejects return of death penalty,
Agence France Presse, October 22, 2004
("According to an opinion poll earlier this year,
77 percent of Poles support the return of capital
punishment and 19 percent are against it").

threw her body off a cliff. Loggins
and Duncan returned to the crime
scene, further mutilating Vickie's
corpse-stabbing and cutting her
180 times, removing a portion of one
lung (one reportedly even bit into
it), and cutting off her fingers and
thumbs. Ask the People, "What do
these two 17-year-olds deserve?"
Inform other peoples about
Chrisopher Simmons, Kenneth Loggins, Trace Duncan, Mark Anthony
Duke, and their kind. Remind them
of the innocent victims-Shirley
Crook, Vickie Deblieux, Dedra Hunt
and her two children Chelisa, 6, and
Chelsea, 7. Let them recall the terror
and suffering of these innocents and
the pleasure or callous indifference
evidenced by these 16- and 17-yearold sadistic, vicious killers inflicting
torture. Then give "the world community" the real choice: Keep these
monsters alive and in prison-allow
them to read, watch TV, exercise outdoors, enjoy snacks, watch movies,
play basketball and softball. Or condemn them to die. And see whether
the "overwhelming weight of international opinion" is to let them live.

After Roper?
Buoyed by this latest categorical
restriction, abolitionists can be
counted on to use their winning
"logic" to continue their piecemeal
assault on the death penalty. Now
that a Court majority has categorically outlawed death as disproportional for juveniles and the mentally
retarded, the "mentally ill" are next.
Pollsters will cooperate to show that
our standards of decency have
evolved to the point where the public clearly answers "no" when asked,
"Do you favor executing the mentally ill?" Phrased this way, the blanket prohibition has strong appeal.
Again, however, the question
obscures moral reality.
The American Psychiatric Association's catalogue of "mental illnesses"-DSM IV-currently classifies
psychopathy and sexual sadism as
mental illnesses. A psychopath is generally intelligent, glib, beats lie detector tests, and feels little fear, while
callously indifferent to the extreme

pain and suffering of others.
Psychopaths populate our prisons.
Two especially stand out among hundreds of prisoners interviewed: "Spray
shooters" who fired machine guns
into a crowd from a passing van, randomly wounding and killing innocent
bystanders, including children. Asked
to consider their innocent victims,
"S.O.L."-"Shit Outta Luck" one
declared. "Shouldn't have gotten in
the way of my bullet," the other,
shrugged. These cold, callous
killers-psychopaths-are without
pity and deserve none.
And then there are the sadistic
rapist/murderers like Michael Ross,
recently executed in Connecticut.
Ross, who strangled eight women to
death, raping seven of them first, was
diagnosed according to the DSM IV
as suffering from the "mental illness"
of "sexual sadism." A person who has
repeated fantasies of causing great
pain and humiliation to unwilling
victims sexually, and either acts on
that fantasy or is troubled by it,
becomes by definition "mentally ill."
(Ironically, if he has those fantasies
but is untroubled by them, according
to the current definition, he is not
sick.) Danny Rolling-the Ninja
killer-would stalk young co-eds,
break into their apartments, rape
and mutilate them, and pose their
bodies pornographically. He, too,
was a sexual sadist and "mentally ill."
The point is, for millennia we have
understood, and the dictionary confirms, that the essence of cruelty is
indifference to, or taking pleasure
in, another's pain and suffering. At
the extreme, the psychopaths and
sadists-the most callous and vicious
who kill either with a depraved indifference or positive enjoyment at the
intense suffering they cause-are the
core of the worst of the worst. Psychiatrically they may be "mentally ill;"
morally they are most evil, and most,
not least, deserving to die.
Abolitionists will probably not
explicitly urge an exemption for psychopaths or sadists. Society generally
detests them, and justifiably so. But if
the Court (or legislatures) can be convinced categorically to exempt "the
mentally ill", once again, these despi-

cable creatures may be shielded
under the umbrella.

Administering
justice after Roper
These challenges are on the horizon,
swiftly approaching. But here we are,
after a U.S. Supreme Court majority
in Roper has rejected individualized
justice for juveniles, adopting instead
a morally obtuse, simplistic solution
to a difficult problem. Manufacturing consensus, national and worldwide, they masquerade their policy
preference as constitutional doctrine. Yet, of course, we must obey
their mandate. In the face of a U.S.
Supreme Court majority's morally
indiscriminate but constitutionally
binding decision, can we still salvage
a morally appropriate response to
the worst of the worst, based upon
individualized justice?
Forever condemned although not
to be killed, Mark Anthony Duke
remains collectively denounced. To
advance the administration of justice
after Roper, the people should continue to condemn him and others like
him. Each state has the power to specially punish the once-condemned,
stripping them of all hope and subjecting them to the harshest prison
conditions the Constitution allows.
No good behavior inside can erase
the past. We must keep our covenant
with the dead. We owe them, him,
and ourselves never to forget or forgive.
To those who seek death for the
most heinous killers-notwithstanding the Court's decision but considering the content of his character and
the consequences of his choicesMark Anthony Duke, forever condemned though never to be executed,
remains "a poster child for us." 4)141
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